#C 41 DEFINITION ZONING SOUTH CAROLINA TRIAL#

(c) Rather, the question must turn, in accord with this Court's 'takings' jurisprudence, on citizens' historic understandings regarding the content of, and the State's power over, the 'bundle of rights' that they acquire when they take title to property. (b) A review of the relevant decisions demonstrates that the 'harmful or noxious use' principle was merely this Court's early formulation of the police power justification necessary to sustain (without compensation) any regulatory diminution in value that the distinction between regulation that 'prevents harmful use' and that which 'confers benefits' is difficult, if not impossible, to discern on an objective, value-free basis and that, therefore, noxious-use logic cannot be the basis for departing from this Court's categorical rule that total regulatory takings must be compensated. Although the Court has never set forth the justification for this categorical rule, the practical-and economic -equivalence of physically appropriating and eliminating all beneficial use of land counsels its preservation.

(a) Regulations that deny the property owner all 'economically viable use of his land' constitute one of the discrete categories of regulatory deprivations that require compensation without the usual case-specific inquiry into the public interest advanced in support of the restraint. The State Supreme Court erred in applying the 'harmful or noxious uses' principle to decide this case. Lucas has properly alleged injury-in-fact with respect to this preamendment deprivation, and it would not accord with sound process in these circumstances to insist that he pursue the late-created procedure before that component of his takings claim can be considered ripe. Because it declined to rest its judgment on ripeness grounds, preferring to dispose of the case on the merits, the latter court's decision precludes, both practically and legally, any takings claim with respect to Lucas's preamendment deprivation. Lucas's takings claim is not rendered unripe by the fact that he may yet be able to secure a special permit to build on his property under an amendment to the Act passed after briefing and argument before the State Supreme Court, but prior to issuance of that court's opinion. 205, line of cases, when a regulation is designed to prevent 'harmful or noxious uses' of property akin to public nuisances, no compensation is owing under the Takings Clause regardless of the regulation's effect on the property's value.ġ. The court ruled that, under the Mugler v. findings' that new construction in the coastal zone threatened a valuable public resource. In reversing, the State Supreme Court held itself bound, in light of Lucas's failure to attack the Act's validity, to accept the legislature's 'uncontested.

#C 41 DEFINITION ZONING SOUTH CAROLINA TRIAL#

The state trial court agreed, finding that the ban rendered Lucas's parcels 'valueless,' and entered an award exceeding $1.2 million. He filed suit against respondent state agency, contending that, even though the Act may have been a lawful exercise of the State's police power, the ban on construction deprived him of all 'economically viable use' of his property and therefore effected a 'taking' under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments that required the payment of just compensation. In 1988, however, the state legislature enacted the Beachfront Management Act, which barred Lucas from erecting any permanent habitable structures on his parcels. At that time, Lucas's lots were not subject to the State's coastal zone building permit requirements. In 1986, petitioner Lucas bought two residential lots on a South Carolina barrier island, intending to build single-family homes such as those on the immediately adjacent parcels.

C 41 definition zoning south carolina